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Disclosure’s Purpose
Hillary A. Sale1
The United States securities regulatory infrastructure requires disclosure
of a wide array of information both by and about covered companies. The basic
purpose of the disclosures is to level the playing field – for investors, for issuers,
and for the public.2 Although the structure is complicated, the premise is fairly
simple. Corporate insiders know far more about the entity than those buying
securities or those impacted by the sale of securities (a group, as we shall see, that
is far larger than simply investors), resulting in an information asymmetry. Thus,
requiring disclosures both before the sale of securities and on an ongoing basis
can provide information to diminish those asymmetries.3 This is, in fact, the
choice of the United States securities regime – to regulate through disclosures,
both in the offering context and on an ongoing, periodic basis.4
Although investor protection is the disclosure goal often touted, this article
develops the purposes of disclosure extending beyond investors to issuers and the
public. Indeed, the disclosure system is designed to level the playing field for
issuers— addressing confidentiality concerns, for example.

In addition, the

system helps to promote confidence in the markets, which, in turn, enables
growth and innovation by creating access to capital – goals important to issuers.
Yet, as importantly, the system also protects the public more broadly. After all,
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the harms of market crashes and other disruptions are not confined to investors
and issuers – despite the fact that writing in this space focuses largely on them.
Disclosure’s purpose, then, is to diminish asymmetries and the space for
fraud, both for those within the entity and for the public affected by the entity.
To achieve these purposes, the system depends on gatekeepers, like corporate
directors who are assigned a role in effectively managing the purpose and
consequences of disclosure. Doing so requires them take ownership of both the
ensuing internal discourse between the entity, its insiders, and its owners, as well
as the external discourse with the entity’s public stakeholders and the public more
generally.5 When directors do so, the resulting discourse and candor helps to
ensure the purposes of disclosure are met.
This article examines the purpose and regulation of this discourse,
emphasizing the role of the board of directors and its attention to public
stakehodlers and the public, with a particular focus on omissions. Omissions occur
when disclosures fail to include specific required information or when, for
example, the disclosed information necessitates additional disclosures to be
complete.

The article proceeds as follows. Part I explores the purposes of

disclosure in corporate discourse and how disclosure requirements are designed
to transmit information. As we will see, the securities disclosure regime aims to
address a broad range of issues -- from fairness to market competitiveness. Part
II develops the omissions theory in the context of the purposes of disclosure, as
well as explicating their role in corporate discourse. Part III turns to the board and
its responsibilities with respect to the purposes of securities disclosures and
corporate discourse, with a particular emphasis on omissions and candor, and
deployng some case studies to develop the theories further. Part IV analyzes the
relationship between directors, disclosure (and its purpose) and omissions, and
publicness, tying the information-forcing-substance theory to director
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gatekeeping and explicating how it can result in more thorough disclosure
outcomes for investors, issuers, and the public – and therby, fulfill disclosure’s
purpose
I.

Disclosures, Discourse, and Purpose
The U.S. securities regime has a long and complicated history with

mandatory disclosure. The regulations require disclosures both at the issuance of
securities and over time, with a periodic system that addresses secondary
markets.6

The United States’ approach to securities regulation focuses on

disclosure and is not merits-based.7 Instead, the system is designed to press for
information through discosures that will allow outsiders to develop their own view
of the merits of the securities.
In this sense, the regime deploys the information-forcing-substance
theory. The premise of this theory, about which I and Professor Langevoort (along
with others) have written, is that although the choice of the authors of the
securities laws was to focus on disclosure, rather than, for example fairness,8
various regulatory provisions create incentives for directors to engage in a
dialogue with management about the basis for any disclosures, and to do so prior
to engaging in discourse with shareholders, stakeholders, and the public.9 Thus,
the statute drives behavior toward the collection and development of
information, producing substantive behavior (discourse with officers and
management and potentially, changes in policies and procedures) on the part of
6
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directors.10 Additionally, requiring specific truthful disclosures forces those who
produce them to both ensure accuracy and develop the underlying systems (like
risk management) that allow the insiders to avoid admitting that no such sytem
exists. This, in turn, supports the purposes of the disclosure regime. Thus,
securities regulatory goals, disclosure regulation, and substantive choices go hand
in hand.
The goal of the regulatory approach is to promote strong and healthy
markets, which, in turn, enable growth and innovation.11 To achieve that goal, the
regime charges corporate players (for our purposes, directors) with responsibility
for both the quality and quantity of disclosures, where quality concerns
affirmative required disclosures and quantity concerns any additional disclosures
needed to ensure completeness.12 The latter is the home of the half-truth and
omissions doctrines.
One of the core purposes of disclosures is to protect investors. In fact, the
modern regulatory scheme has its roots in the Great Depression that followed the
1929 market crash.13 Both events— the crash and the Depression— resulted at
least in part from a lack of investor trust in the market.14 Recognizing that no one
wants to play in a rigged market and that investors had been harmed by market
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manipulation,15 Section 2 of the Securities Act of 1934 stresses that the “national
public interest” undergirds the regulatory regime.16
The investor-protection goal is met on the front end with disclosure
requirements that address both required disclosures and omissions.17

This

disclosure regimen is paired with an anti-fraud rule, the enforcement of which
plays a key back-end, investor-protection role.18 When taken together, the result
is the requirement that disclosures may not be misleading, either affirmatively or
through omissions or half-truths.19 The basic premise here is that fraud in the
marketplace is costly and prohibiting and punishing it promotes market
confidence.20 Truthful and appropriately complete disclosures are key to building
investor confidence.21

Thus, disclosures allow investors to make reasoned

decisions confidently, trusting that they have the most accurate information
available.22
15
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Note that the disclosure regime does not prevent risky products from
being sold. Indeed, the regulatory choice was to provide investors with accurate
information, not to develop a regime where regulators determined the merits of
the securities or entity.23 As a result, regulators’ role — even when reviewing
offering documents, for example — is not to determine whether the issuer’s
proposed business or products are “worthy.” Instead, the regulators review
documents for sufficient disclosures, and then potential purchasers choose
whether to invest.24 This regulatory choice arguably heightens the importance of
sufficient and complete disclosures as well as a concern about omissions.
The “national public interest” referred to in Section 2, however,
encompasses not only investors, but also extends to issuers and the general
public. Like investors, issuers perform more confidently in a robust and fluid
market.25 To that end, disclosure’s purpose is to address information asymmetries
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beyond those facing investors.26 As Professor Langevoort’s works reveal,
corporate Insiders, like officers and directors, know far more about the entity than
investors and the public, but they may lack appropriate incentives to ensure
disclosure.27 Addressing information asymmetries thus helps to put different
companies on a more equal footing in the market, with the comparable
information allowing investors to contrast the entities.28
This aspect of disclosure has at least two roles. First, it helps to level the
playing field between issuers by requiring all of them to provide similar
information. In this sense the disclosure addresses the confidentiality concerns of
issuers, requiring that equivalent information be shared publicly. Here, then, the
disclosure regulation helps to address the concerns of corporate issuers that
selective disclosure might result in a competitive disadvantage. In that sense, the
mandatory regime also addresses fairness concerns, which, along with those
related to confidentiality, might otherwise result in inadequate issuer incentives
to disclose, a situation which could, in turn, produce in suboptimal disclosure
levels. The prohibition on material omissions also plays a key role here, ensuring
that some issuers cannot take unfair advantage of their peers by omitting to
disclose certain particulars.29

sharp rise in the stock market may lead to expansion of business activity beyond the bounds of
sound economics”).
26

Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations Mislead
Stock Market Investors (And Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 114 (1997).
27

Id.

28

Sale & Thompson, supra note 6, at 528. See also House Consideration, Amendment, and Passage
of H.R. 9323, Securities Exchange Bill of 1934, 78 Cong. 7717 (1934) (Statement of Mr. Ford) (“Now,
I think, we have a bill that will protect the public by preventing inequitable and unfair practices
and that will in the end prove beneficial to legitimate operators on our stock exchanges. This bill
does three things. It protects investors, controls market manipulations that are destructive to
values, and tends to curb destructive speculation…[the President] is acting in the interest of honest
business and honest investors”).
29

Sale & Langevoort, supra note 2, at 777.

7

Second, disclosure provides investors with information to enable them to
choose between potential investments which are not otherwise fungible.30 When
investors have the information necessary to make informed choices, and when
they have confidence in the information, they may broaden their potential
purchases to investments that otherwise would have been discounted or entirely
foregone.31 The information-forcing-substance theory plays a role here as well.
Categories of required disclosures mean that an issuer with nothing to report in
a particular category will stand out relative to its peers. To avoid that outcome,
issuers implement systems so that they are able to produce disclosures like their
peers. Thus, the required disclosure/information results in substantive corporate
decision-making and action on the part of directors and management. The
resulting systems and disclosures about them help to increase capital investment
in issuers, including some that might not otherwise have received it. That in turn,
contributes to the flow of capital and allocative efficiency, as well as to growth
and innovation.
Disclosure is also designed to complement corporate governance systems.
Here, the idea is that once an investor buys stocks, it becomes an owner of the
entity.

Yet, shareholder owners suffer from the classic agency concerns

implicated by the distance between owners and operators.32 Of course, the harm
from weak or bad governance extends well beyond shareholders to the public
more generally. The disclosure regime helps to police this space in at least two

30
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Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Frauds, Markets, and Fraud-on-the-Market: The Tortured Transition
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Sen. Rep No. 73-47, at 1 (1933) (stating that the bill’s aim is to “protect honest enterprise, seeking
capital by honest presentation, against the competition afforded by dishonest securities offered
to the public through crooked promotion … to bring into productive channels of industry and
development capital which has grown timid to the point of hoarding; and to aid in providing
employment and resotring buying and consuming power.”)
32
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ways. In the first instance, mandatory disclosure decreases monitoring costs on
the part of shareholders.33 The result is the facilitation of issuer capital raising
and, in theory, the allocation of capital to the best issuers; thus creating
substantial benefits for issuers as well.34 Further, as discussed in Part III, the
regulatory structure also inserts directors into the disclosure space, demanding
that they play a role in diminishing information asymmetries and detecting fraud,
which helps to decrease shareholder monitoring costs, facilitate capital raising,
and diminish the impacts of publicness.35 In addition, the construct of publicness
— explored more fully in Part IV —is important to discourse and disclosure
because it connects the interaction of media, analysts, and the public to issuers’
disclosure choices.36
As the 2008-2009 financial crisis and the accompanying slow recovery
made clear, healthy markets are key to growth.37 Disclosure plays a role here as
well. The disclosure theory posits that information promotes robust capital raising
and markets.38 In this space, the regulatory structure is generally focused on
offering regulations and a wide array of required disclosures. The goal is building
and maintaining market confidence because without it, investors will decline to
invest or, arguably, demand larger premia before being willing to invest.39 Why?
Because when markets become unreliable, investors choose to put their money in
the bank or elsewhere, and market liquidity decreases as a result.40 This, in turn,
33
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34
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produces an additional problem: the cost of capital increases.41 When that
happens, in theory, investment decreases.42 Those decreases in investment harm
not just issuers, but also stakeholders such as employees, as well as the public
more broadly. Thus, disclosure regulation plays a powerful role on the front end:
it helps to improve accuracy in price setting. Better pricing helps to allocate capital
to appropriate investments which helps to fuel growth, benefiting investors,
issuers, stakeholders, and the public.43
Of course, all of these arguments in favor of regulation have detractors and
counter-arguments.44 Yet, despite calls for changes and overhauls, the system has
remained firmly in place – at least in part because market issues and situations
involving significant greed and fraud provide regular counterweights to
proponents of deregulation.45 As we shall see next, omissions continue to play a
part in the debate about the power of disclosure.
II.

Discourse, Omissions, and Liability

41

See John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 229,
300–11 (2007) (discussing evidence on the cost of capital and enforcement).
42
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43
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44
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Coffee, Jr., Systemic Risk after Dodd-Frank: Contingent Capital and the Need for Regulatory
Strategies beyond Oversight, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 795 (2011) (arguing that contingent capital and
preferred shareholders can play a role in preventing excessive risk taking and the ensuing
regulation that comes with it); Paul G. Mahoney, Technology, Property Rights in Information, and
Securities Regulation, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 815 (1997) (arguing that technology, in combination with
market intermediaries, can help to alleviate information asymmetries).
45
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Omissions are key to the integrity of the disclosure regime and, therefore,
to the other goals of disclosure.46 As noted above, the securities regulatory regime
is one premised on information (and the correlating substance) through disclosure
and the resulting discourse. There is a thorough and ongoing regulatory structure
that requires substantial, affirmative, truthful disclosures both when an issuer
offers securities to the public and, in an integrated manner, on an ongoing basis.
A cornerstone of this regimen is that disclosures cannot be so carefully calculated
or cabined that they mislead by omission.47 Omissions are not, of course,
affirmative statements or facts; they are, rather, statements with facts or other
information missing. Their disclosure is required when material and necessary to
make other disclosures truthful or not misleading.48 In this sense, the requirement
is actually a prohibition against misleading half-truths.
Half-truths and omissions have a daunting history in securities law and
litigation, and Professor Langevoort, whose work we celebrate in this volume, has
thought and written more about these issues than any other scholar of corporate
and securities law.49 As Professors Langevoort and Gulati pointed out, the
omissions doctrine is confused and limited by courts misunderstanding the
difference between duty (whether disclosure is required) and materiality.50 This

46

See generally Langevoort, supra note 15.

47

See Securities Act of 1933 § 11; 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1933).

48

Securities Act of 1933 § 11; 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1933); Langevoort, supra note 15, at 88.

49

See Langevoort, supra note 15; Mitu Gulati, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, & Donald C.
Langevoort, Fraud by Hindsight, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 773 (2004); Donald C. Langevoort, Lies without
Liars: Janus Capital and Conservative Securities Jurisprudence, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 933 (2013);
Donald C. Langevoort, Commentary: Stakeholder Values, Disclosure, and Materiality, 48 CATH. U. L.
REV. 93 (1998); Donald C. Langevoort, Fraud and Deception by Securities Professionals , 61 TEX. L.
REV. 1247 (1983).
50
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Materiality and Divergent Disclosure: The Necessary Search for a Duty to Disclose Material NonFinancial Information, 26 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 137 (2007).
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confusion recently came to a head in a case discussed in Part III and on which the
Supreme Court granted certiorari, Leidos.51 The allegations in Leidos involved
omissions related to the cancellation of the issuer’s largest revenue source,
contracts with the City of New York, due to fraudulent billing practices. Those
issues were not resolved because the parties settled the case just prior to its
argument and filed a motion to remove it from the Court’s calendar and hold it in
abeyance pending lower court approval of the settlement.52 Nevetheless, the
omissions issues highlighted by the Leidos case are unlikely to go away.
Under multiple provisions of the securities laws, private plaintiffs can sue
for affirmative misstatements and omissions.53 The first provision that allows for
an express cause of action is Section 11(a) of the 1933 Securities Act. It states:
In case any part of the registration statement, when such part became
effective, contained an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state
a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the
statements therein not misleading, any person acquiring such security ...
may[] sue.54
As the language of this provision makes clear, there are two potential types of
liability. The first clause focuses on what an issuer stated affirmatively, and the
second on what the issuer did not say, or omitted.55 Section 11 does not require

51

Leidos, Inc. v. Indiana Pub. Ret. Sys., 137 S. Ct. 1395, 1396 (2017) (cert. granted).

52

Leidos, Inc. v. Indiana Pub. Ret. Sys., 138 S. Ct. 369 (2017) (motion granted).

53

Securities Act of 1933 §§ 10b, 11, 12(a)(2); 15 U.S.C. §§ 77j(b), 77k(a), 77l(a)(2) (1933);
Langevoort, supra note 15, at 88.
54

Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1933).

55

Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Indus. Pension Fund, 135 S. Ct. 1318, 1323 (2015).
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fraud or the intent to deceive.56 Rather, except with respect to forward looking
statements,57 it is a strict liability provision.58
This standard of liability is tied directly to the purposes of the disclosures.
Section 11 is an enforcement mechanism for the disclosure-based premise of the
Securities Act: that issuers provide “full and fair disclosure of information” when
engaging in a public offering.59 The idea is that when a company is raising money
by issuing securities to the public, it is important to diminish the asymmetries and
opportunities for fraud. Section 11 imposes liability on those responsible for false
or misleading registration statements to all purchasers—regardless of from whom
(issuer, underwriter, etc.) they bought. The purpose of the disclosures is to level
the playing field for competing issuers and to decrease information asymmetries
for investors and for the public. In addition, the regulatory apparatus not only
requires an extensive array of specific disclosures, it also contains a requirement
for additional information needed to prevent what is disclosed from being
misleading.60 Thus, embedded in each required disclosure is a prohibition against
misleading half-truths.61
In addition to Section 11, Section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act provides
liability for misstatements and omissions in another offering document, the
56

Id.

57

15 U.S.C. § 77z-2(c)(1)(B).

58

Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 381–82 (1983) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d
Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1933) (Section 11 creates “correspondingly heavier legal liability” in line with
responsibility to the public)). “The section was designed to assure compliance with the disclosure
provisions of the Act by imposing a stringent standard of liability on the parties who play a direct
role in a registered offering.” Id. There are defenses available, including the due diligence defense.
15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3).
59

Omnicare, supra note 49, at 1323 (citing Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622).

60

Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77(a) (1933).

61

The scope of this prohibition, of course, is at issue here and has been the focus of
considerable scholarly writing including by one of the authors here. See, e.g., Langevoort,
supra note 15.
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prospectus.62 Section 12(a)(2) allows purchasers to rescind or assert damages if a
seller commits fraud in a prospectus or through an oral statement, and it also
requires privity. Its coverage overlaps to some extent with that of Section 11 , and
it like its Section 11 counterpart, this provision does not require reliance.
Defendants do, however, have a defense that allows them to prove that they
neither knew nor should have known of the untruth or omission.63 Again, the
purpose here is also to prevent misleading disclosures in the offering context and
thereby protect investors, issuers, and the public.
The final provision at issue in the majority of the private-plaintiff classaction suits is Section 10(b) and the accompanying rule, 10b-5, (Section 10(b)
claims) of the Securities Exchange Act. This is the cause of action that applies to
fraud claims for any misstatements and omissions on the part of issuers.64 As a
result, a Section 10(b) claim is not tied to an offering document. Although initially
developed as an implied cause of action, and subject to arguments that the courts
could “disimply” it, Congress has since legislated around it, developing pleading
standards and many other requirements and thus, arguably, firmly establishing its
place in the securities litigation arsenal.65 Moreover, in doing so, Congress
expounded on the connection between the private enforcement role that this
cause of action serves and the purposes of disclosure discussed in Part I of this
article.
For a Section 10(b) claim, plaintiffs must plead, and if the case goes to trial,
prove, multiple elements, including:
62

Securities Act of 1933 § 12(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2) (1933). Section 12(a)(1) provides liability
for any person who sells securities that was required to be registered but was not. 15 U.S.C. §
77l(a)(1) (1933).
63

th

See e.g., Casella v. Webb, 883 F.2d 805, 809 (9 Cir. 1989). As a result, this provision is
th
negligence-like in application. Dennis v. Gen. Imaging, Inc., 918 F.2d 496, 507 (5 Cir. 1990).
64

Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1934).

65

See Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27, 37 (2011) (“We have implied a private
cause of action from the text and purpose of § 10(b).”).
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1) A material misrepresentation or omission by the defendant(s);
2) Scienter;
3) A connection between the misrepresentation or omission and the
purchase or sale of a security;
4) Reliance upon the misrepresentation (but not an omission);
5) Economic loss; and
6) Loss causation.66
As the above list makes clear, Section 10(b) claims are more complicated than
their Section 11 and 12(a)(2) counterparts. In particular, the scienter element is
subject to a very strict pleading standard.67 As a result, an “inference of scienter
must be more than merely plausible or reasonable—it must be cogent and at least
as compelling as any opposing inference of nonfraudulent intent.”68

Most

importantly, Section 10(b) allows for issuer liability to investors for misstatements
and omissions regardless of whether they occur in an offering document, thus
broadening significantly the potential scope of liability.69
A key regulatory disclosure provision, Item 303 of Regulation S-K,
Management’s Discussion and Analysis, presses for narrative information about
the company.70 In particular, Item 303 requires information about known trends
and uncertainties.71 The thrust of this requirement, of course, is that issuers
66
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should share what they know (or have reason to know) about what is coming
around the corner.72 As Professor Langevoort has so aptly put it, if the company
has had three great quarters, but knows that the bottom is about to fall out of its
business, a reasonable investor would find that information material to an
investment decision.73 In short, although we do not require issuers to disclose
everything, disclosures full of gaps are useless to investors and the public. They
also undermines the issuer-related purposes of disclosure.
Nevertheless, the half-truths and omissions doctrines have stretched the
courts’ abilities. In effect, the challenge with omissions is two-sided. The premise
for disclosure and liability seems relatively straightforward. If a company is
required to make disclosure under the securities laws, as in the case of the MD&A,
then that disclosure must be sufficiently complete so as not to be misleading.74
Or, put differently, there is no point in requiring certain disclosures if an issuer is
free to cabin them, through omissions, in a manner that makes what is disclosed
misleading. The same is true for voluntary disclosures.75 To do otherwise would
undermine the very purposes of a disclosure-based securities regulatory regime.
Thus, the disclosure structure, with its emphasis on omissions, is designed to press
for complete and accurate information.
Yet, a key challenge with omissions is that there is a temptation by any
investor harmed by a purchase to argue that more information was necessary and,

Tone shifts, sentences become more complex, and the obfuscation of the language increases.
Donald C. Langevoort, Disasters and Disclosures, SCHOLARSHIP @ GEORGETOWN LAW 1, 14-16 (2018),
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/2024.
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therefore, omissions must have occurred.76 As the saying goes, hindsight is
twenty-twenty, making it easy to argue about what should have been disclosed
when time has passed and the investment looks less promising. The result is
pressure to prevent every bit of missing information from becoming an actionable
omission.
The line between the two is tricky to draw. The trouble with omissions is
that because they are not affirmative statements, they “don’t exist.” As a result,
the courts have determined that there is no reliance requirement for an omission
on the theory that investors cannot prove reliance on something that was not said.
This is particularly important in the context of class actions, where reliance might
well be different for every purchaser. Yet, without reliance as an element, the
claims are arguably easier to bring, potentially expanding liability dramatically.77
As a result, courts have cabined potential claims such that, in order to trigger
liability for an omission, the alleged misstatement and the omission must pertain
to the same subject matter, and the missing information must render the
statement misleading by altering its meaning.78
This concern about the expansion of 10b-5 claims has been, and continues
to be, a focus of the courts. In their article, Professors Langevoort and Gulati
argued that concerns about increases in these claims may well have been at the
root of earlier attempts by courts to limit their potential.79 Nevertheless, since
that time, Congress has stepped in and severely restricted the power of the 10b5 cause of action– developing strict pleading limitations, heightened state of mind
requirements, fee-shifting provisions, lead-plaintiff provisions, and more.80 This
76
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higher standard means that the 10b-5 and fraud cases that are brought are both
stronger and more likely to achieve real settlements.81 Thus, many of the
arguments that defendants and others gnawing at the omissions doctrine make
about the strike-suit nature of these class actions have arguably been tackled.82
Additionally, omissions are actionable only if material,83 but here the
doctrine is subject to confusion. The confusion stems, in part, from the fact that
the SEC’s standard for materiality in the MD&A is different from (and lower than)
the standard for proving materiality under Sections 11, 12, and 10(b).84 The
resolution, however, is relatively simple. Whether something should have been
included in the MD&A should be judged by the SEC’s materiality standard. But,
whether a private plaintiff can bring a claim for liability should be measured by the
appropriate liability provision for the cause of action. Thus, for an omission to
result in liability in a private-plaintiff class action, it must meet the requisite
materiality standard.85 This standard is set forth in TSC v. Northway: whether the
omitted information “would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as
having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made available.”86 In
short, if the market possessed the correct information, a false statement or
omission will not be materially misleading.87 Further, to the extent that the
misstatement in question involves speculative information, as is much of the
information contained in Item 303, the test requires balancing the probability of
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the event occurring along with the anticipated magnitude of that event.88
Importantly, neither standard involves a bright-line rule or strict percentage
approach. In fact, it is well understood that any percentage deemed material
could result in fraud up to the line, and that a definition of materiality that is too
stringent would result in the wrong incentives and the potential for more fraud.89
The courts have been applying these materiality standards for decades,
and they are quite straightforward – whether applied to affirmative
misstatements or omissions.90

Moreover, the standard for both types of

misleading information must be the same. Any other approach would lead to a
standard that creates liability for an affirmative misstatement but not for silence
that creates a misleading outcome.91 That would be untenable. It would create
an incentive to commit fraud through omissions and undermine the investor,
issuer, and public interest protection goals of disclosure. It would also diminish
the incentives of those charged with ensuring accurate and complete disclosures
– the directors. We turn to them and their role in disclosure’s purpose and in
discourse next.
III.

Directors, Discourse, and Candor
As we have seen, there are many demands on our disclosure regimen and

those, in turn, produce demands on the director gatekeepers. Disclosure and
candor are interrelated, and directors have a role in both. So far, this article has
focused on disclosure and its purpose. We now turn to the connection between
disclosure, its purpose, and candor, a fiduciary duty, with a focus on Delaware law.
88
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Like disclosure, candor is an information-forcing rule, requiring the sharing of
information between officers and directors, for example.92 Candor also operates
in contexts implicating information shared outside of the corporation, like when
the corporation asks for a shareholder vote on a merger.93 Here, the Delaware
courts generally look to the directors to determine whether proxy disclosures are
sufficiently candid.94
For the purposes of securities disclosures, candor presses on the
informational asymmetries that are internal to the corporation.

Thus, the

fiduciary duty of candor can play a role in addressing the challenges that directors,
who have limited time and access to information, face with respect to their officer
counterparts.95 The demands of the disclosure regimen press on the substantive
choices that officers and boards make as well as providing an opportunity for
boards to ask questions and question answers. This is particularly important when
companies face, for example, revnue, profit, or other challenges. Indeed, what
we know from the evidence is that disclosures tend to be more transparent and
complete when times are good.96 But, when a company experiences a downturn,
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disclosure quality suffers.

Obfuscation and complex sentences abound.

Cageyness increases.97
Directors are arguably situated as the gatekeepers of disclosures in order
to ensure candor and completeness, which, in turn, supports the purposes of
disclosure. Of course, directors must trust officers to provide relevant information
but, as this part of the article makes clear, the SEC and the laws and regulations
place expectations on directors to mediate the information asymmetry between
insiders and outsiders, performing an agency cost role.98 Directors perform this
role through discourse and developing information and substance.
The securities laws and regulations, along with various orders and
statements from the SEC, emphasize that directors must actively engage in
reviewing disclosures, thereby adding to the information-forcing-substance
nature of the securities provisions.99 The information-forcing-substance theory is
part of the architecture of the Securities Act of 1933. For example, as noted
above, Section 11 of the Securities Act provides a strict-liability, express cause of
action for misstatements and omissions in a Registration Statement.100 The
statute specifically includes directors as defendants.101 They do have a due
diligence defense available, and it has the impact of making the claim negligencelike (as opposed to strict liability based) in nature.102
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These provisions are, in effect, a cornerstone of the information-forcingsubstance theory of the federal securities laws. Here, the due-diligence provision
creates an incentive for directors to engage in a dialogue with management about
the basis for any disclosures, and to do so prior to making the disclosures public
and engaging in discourse with shareholders, stakeholders, and the public.103 This,
in turn, supports the purposes of the disclosure regime.
The statute also provides that directors, as parties named in the
registration statement, can avoid liablity in two other circumstances arguably
designed to force discourse and candor. For example, if a named party resigns
and informs the SEC of the materially false or misleading statement before the
effective date of the registration statement, she has a statutory defense.104 The
design of this provision arguably urges directors to push back internally and, when
unsuccessful, to make a noisy exit – through resignation. Directors who have been
duped by officers can also escape liablity by informing the SEC and the public of a
false or misleading registration statement after the effective date.105 Here again,
the defense is candor-focused, noisy, and, thereby, supports the purposes of
disclosure.
There are many other ways in which the regulatory structure has evolved
both in an information-forcing manner and where the role of directors is
implicated. Regulation S-K, of which the MD&A is a part, is a classic example. As
mentioned in Part II of this article, the MD&A requires information about known
trends and uncertainties related to liquidity, capital resources, and results of
operations.106 The MD&A’s purpose is to provide investors with a narrative that
describes the business from management’s perspective, indicating where gaps
103
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(uncertainties) might exist, including, for example, changes in sales, revenues, or
income.107

These categories are ones about which investors would want

information and about which directors should know.
The MD&A is included both in offering documents subject to the 1933 Act
and in the periodic disclosures required through the 1934 Act.108 The same is true
of many other areas of Regulation S-K, including the risk disclosures required by
Item 503.109 Indeed, arguably, risk overlaps with all of the disclosures in the
MD&A. Understanding evolving risks to an issuer’s business plan is key to
investment and to the directors’ oversight role.110
In addition, all of these disclosures are subject to liability.111 For offering
documents, Section 11 (registration statement) and Section 12(a)(2) (prospectus)
apply.112 For other documents, including the periodic disclosures, Section 10(b)
applies.113 As noted above, the materiality standard for all three provisions is the
same: the reasonable investor and probability/magnitude for forward-looking
information.114 Liability, of course, is key to the information-forcing-substance
theory – it is a back-end enforcement mechanism for the disclosure regime and
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its purposes and, arguably, a key mechanism in prompting the discourse necessary
to produce good disclosures as well.115
As a result, every disclosure pursuant to Regulation S-K requires that the
people involved: (1) ensure that the information exists; (2) confirm it is accurate;
(3) determine whether and how to disclose it, including ensuring sufficient
disclosure; and (4) disclose the information.116 Embedded in this process is the
concept of omissions.

Regulation S-K directly addresses omissions with a

requirement that any disclosures must include sufficient information so as not to
make them misleading.117 Here again, directors, discourse, and candor play a role.
Indeed, directors may not “blindly” rely on documents prepared by
officers. Instead, before invoking the due diligence defense, the directors must
do a reasonable investigation, have reasonable grounds to believe, and actually
believe that the registration statement did not contain material misstatements or
omissions.118 Thus, they must be “active good faith monitors” before they can
claim due diligence.119 Accomplishing this requires candid discourse between
directors and officers and between directors and those preparing the disclosures
(experts or otherwise). This is information-forcing-substance in action with one
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goal being ensuring candor in public disclosures and, thereby, protecting issuers,
investors, and the public.
In addition to the statutory provisions that contribute to our
understanding of disclosure, candor, and discourse, there are also SEC
enforcement actions that implicate directors and their role in ensuring the
purposes of disclosure are upheld.120 There are several themes running through
these matters. For example, directors may not defer too much to insiders.121 They
must meet regularly.122 And, if they fail to follow through on requests for
information to management, they are also likely to fail to meet their
responsibilities under the securities laws.123 Further, directors who know officers
are under investigation for criminal charges and fail to share this sort of
information with shareholders in a prompt and accurate fashion are failing in their
securities monitoring roles.124 Similarly, directors in a company with a high burn
rate need to know if there are liquidity or credit freeze issues and, in some
120
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circumstances, update information to shareholders.125 Those who do not, fail in
their duties to shareholders. In short, directors have a “responsibility affirmatively
to keep themselves informed of developments within the company and to seek
out the nature of corporate disclosures to determine if adequate disclosures are
being made.”126

This role, which connects directly to the purpose of the

disclsoures, is heightened when the conduct of management is implicated and, of
course, when the issues are key to the company’s survival or its business.127
These themes are echoed in more recent SEC enforcement actions as well
as in statements by the Department of Justice. For, example, in 2000, the SEC
entered a cease and desist order against an outside director of Incomnet, arguing
that she knew or should have known that an officer had engaged in fraud and that
prior public statements were inaccurate.128 The order also emphasized the role of
directors in policing fraud, stating that they must “maintain a general familiarity
with the corporation’s public disclosures and accounting practices and investigate
‘red flags’ that come to their attention.”129 In addition, the SEC criticized the
directors for failing to “establish procedures reasonably designed to ensure the
accuracy of Incomnet’s public statements.”130 In doing so, the SEC reiterated the
role that directors must play in ensuring that disclosures are complete and

125

Report of Investigation in the Matter of National Telephone Co., Inc., Relating to Activities of
the Outside Directors of National Telephone Co., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-14380, 13 SEC
Docket 1393, 1396 (Jan. 16, 1978).
126

Id.

127

17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(3)(ii); Langevoort & Gulati, supra note 44, at 1648.

128

In re Rita L. Schwartz, Exchange Act Release No. 42684, 72 SEC Docket 432 (Apr. 13, 2000)
(entering cease and desist order against outside director; stating that “directors have a duty . . . to
oversee the corporation’s financial reporting process and to ensure the integrity and completeness
of public statements made by the corporation”). The standard here is negligence. Id.
129

Id.

130

Id.

26

accurate, as well as the valuable role that directors play in ensuring that the
purposes of disclosure are fulfilled. These securities-based roles are directly tied
to the directors’ fiduciary, good-faith obligations under Delaware law.131
The SEC also made similar allegations against directors in the Chancellor
Corporation matter. There, the directors were members of the audit committee
when officers fired the company’s auditor for refusing to support reporting
suspect financial results and information reported by the officers.132 According to
the SEC complaint, at least one of the directors knew of the underlying audit
concerns, but “took no steps” to investigate the issues.133 The SEC accused the
directors of “ignoring clear warning signs that financial improprieties were
ongoing at the company and … failing to ensure that the company’s public filings
were accurate.”134 Indeed, with respect to one of the director defendants, the
SEC asserted that he signed the annual report “without taking any steps to ensure
that it did not contain materially misleading statements, … made no inquiry into
the [new auditor’s] reasons” for the change in position, and failed to check into
several related party arrangements involving the CEO.135

There are similar

allegations with respect to the company’s restatements, with the SEC
characterizing the director as “ignoring red flags and never question[ing] whether
there was any basis” for the revisions.136
At a minimum, a change in auditor should prompt clear and direct
questioning and discussion (candid discourse) between directors and
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management.137 Indeed, in order to help prevent these sorts of shenanigans,
management is no longer allowed to serve on the audit committee.138 The
purpose of that change was to increase the role of independent directors in
ensuring accurate and truthful disclosures and to prompt the exact sort of candid
discourse missing in this case.139 In short, the director’s role in the informationforcing regime requires active, candid discourse between directors and corporate
insiders. The to so engage undermines the purposes of the disclosure regime.
The issues presented in the Leidos case raise similar red flag questions. The
claims were about the company’s failure to reveal that a key source of revenue
tied to its projections was in jeopardy.140 The amounts at issue were quite
significant, and the reason for the contract and revenue issues was that the
company had engaged in an overbilling scheme with its key government client.
According to the plaintiffs, the company valued the market opportunity that might
grow out of its contract with the New York City at over $2 billion.141 The City’s
initial budget for the project was only $63 million; yet within a short period of
time, and due to allegedly fraudulent overbilling, the City paid almost $700 million
before catching the improprieties.142 These improprieties, the plaintiffs’ alleged,
put at risk the Leidos’s government contracting business, “from which it derived
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97% of its revenues.”143 Indeed, the company’s annual report specifically noted
the importance of its relationships and contracts with government agencies.
Shortly after the City became aware of the fraudulent billings, the criminal
investigations began, and Leidos began to lose government contracts.144
According to the plaintiffs, the directors knew about the misconduct, the
loss of business opoortunities, and the involvement of its employees in the
improprieties.145 Nevertheless, the directors allowed the 10-K to move forward,
with their signatures and without disclosures about the problems.146 Although the
arguments have their own complexities, the story is similar to many others of this
nature. Item 303 requires disclosure of known trends and uncertainties that are
reasonably expected to impact on a company’s sales or income.147 Yet, despite
evidence to the contrary, the 10-K, with the MD&A included, did not provide
information about Leidos’s fraudulent overbilling scheme, which was allegedly
known to the defendants and connected to a significant portion of its projected
revenue growth.148

The alleged omissions thus implicated the directors’

information-forcing-substance role. This set of allegations also links the disclosure
zone to the directors’ state fiduciary duties. Directors focus on strategy, risk, and
people. All three of those obligations are tied to the company’s core business,
revenues, and profits. What could be more material?
In response the Leidos defendants argued that because the issuer had not
discussed the issue at all, there was no need to clarify it with additional
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information.149 This, they argued, was a “pure omission,” in contrast to an
omission required to make an affirmative disclosure not misleading.150 This
argument is specious at best and has the potential to gut Item 303. The disclosure
regimen is clear: if the revenue source was key to the company’s growth, Item
303 requires disclosure and discussion.151 Indeed, the government’s argument
was that reasonable investors understand that when issuers discuss results in
financial reports, there is an implicit representation that the issuer is providing all
of the information that Item 303 requires.152 In fact, this is arguably the premise
for the requirement that additional information be disclosed to ensure that the
disclosures are not misleading. It is also consistent with the statutory mandate
that issuers comply with regulatory disclosure requirements deemed by the SEC
“as necessary or appropriate for the proper protection of investors and to insure
fair dealing in the security.”153 Here it is helpful to recall that even though the
goals of the disclosure regimen are broad, but at bottom, it requires a level playing
field for issuers, investors, and the public.
Omissions are at the heart of another significant securities fraud case, as
well: Ramirez v. Exxon. There, the plaintiffs alleged that Exxon violated 10b-5 by
omitting disclosures related to its recoverable oil reserves and climate change.154
In particular, the plaintiffs alleged that internal documents contradicted the
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disclosures in Exxon’s MD&A/S-K. In support, they argued that the issuer’s
internal reports revealed that climate change would materially impact Exxon’s
ability fully to extract its hydrocarbon reserves, and, thereby, negatively impact its
future business model.155 The failure to include this information, which was
directly linked to the information disclosed, undercuts the designated role of the
MD&A “as an early warning device intended to alert investors as to risks, trends,
and uncertainties with respect to the [issuer’s] … business that might make it
unwise to rely on past performance.156 In short, as Professor Langevoort points
out, when an issuer describes some risks, but omits one for fear that revealing it
would damage the company, the result is materially misleading. Why? Because
the disclosure of some material risks makes it reasonable for an investor to believe
that the disclosure was complete – or that others were not omitted.157
IV.

Disclosure, Discourse, Directors, and Publicness

Like Leidos, the Exxon case reveals both the link between disclosure and
publicness, and the role of directors in managing publicness. Recall that in Part I,
we focused on the multiple ways in which disclosure facilitates capital raising,
issuer parity, investment, and efficient markets. When coupled with enforcement
and litigation, the system is designed to increase the odds of a strong and healthy
market system -- where fraud is policed and punished and capital is allocated
efficiently.158 Although this system is, of course, important for investors and
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issuers, its reach extends beyond those who actively engage to many others,
including employees, stakeholders, and more.159 This is the zone of publicness.
Publicness is a concept that encompasses the interplay between the inside
players in the corporation, directors and officers, and the outsiders, like media and
analysts, who cover the company.160 Those outsiders reframe and recapitulate
information about the issuer and, in that sense, they play an important role in the
public perception of the company. The decisions that the issuer and its inside
actors make can have very significant impacts outside of the entity. After all,
corporations are allowed to wield significant economic and political power,161 and
as a result are expected to consider the implications of their choices in a larger
context than simply the bounds of the entity.162 Here, publicness is substantive,
requiring thought and action on the part of corporate insiders. Moreover, it is
about both what is disclosed and what is not. It is also about how those choices
impact the issuer, investors, markets, and the public more broadly.
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Failing to act with publicness in mind has powerful consequences. In the
Exxon case, the climate-change omissions resulted in a series of reactions and
ongoing rounds of media coverage. For example, shareholders filed claims against
the company, officers, and directors for securities law violations.163 Stakeholders,
like scientists and states, reacted strongly with concerns about the company’s
failure to disclose its own climate change concerns.164 The SEC, multiple attorneys
general, and various municipalities began to investigate the company over the
omissions.

Thus, the media attention, a form of publicness, resulted in

investagions and further attempts to regulate and control the company’s business
decisions, additional layers of publicness.165
Exxon then struck back, countersuing the public officials, arguing that they
had engaged in a politically-motivated consipiracy to violate its free speech
rights.166 A federal judge threw this case out, calling Exxon’s theory “implausible”
and described it as running “roughshod over the adage that the best defense is a
good offense.”167 The result is an additional wave of bad publicity that makes the
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company look like a bully. In addition, the negative public opinon of the company
and its dishonesty arguably worsened.
Moreover, the attorneys general involved in the litigation are now seeking
documents from Exxon going as far back as 1976 to determine what the company
knew about climate change and greenhouse gas emissions.168 They also want
documents concerning investor communications on climate change as well as
communications with groups associated with “climate skepticism.”169 In some
cases, the attorneys general involved are arguing that their states face serious
costs to address climate change, and oil companies should help foot the bill.170 For
its part, Exxon has adopted a strong stance in the litigation and is alleging that
there are multiple conspiracies against it.171 In short, the climate change omissions
and the lawsuit produced a classic publicness cycle.172
How did this happen? At least in part, the Exxon case, like Leidos, may be
the result of blind spots as well as a failure of the directors to engage and manage,
ex ante, with publicness in mind. Indeed, both examples reveal why ensuring
complete disclosures matters. Recall that the purpose of these disclosures is to
protect investors, issuers, and the public as well as to ensure fair dealing in the
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security.173 Omissions undercut the value of the disclosures and thus erode the
purposes. Thus, omissions matter to investors, to stakeholders, to markets, to the
public, and to other issuers. As the SEC stated, disclosures under 303 are required,
and by implication (and by rule), investors (and the market as well as stakeholders)
should be able to assume that the required relevant information has been
disclosed in an omission-free manner.174
Directors have a crucial role to play here: developing candid discourse
within the corporation before the disclosures and the external discourse occur. As
Professor Langevoort’s work on behavioral theory in corporations reveals,
directors must foster open, truthful relationships with management to combat the
structural asymmetry that may increase managers’ incentives to suppress
negative information about the day-to-day operations of the corporation when
communicating with the board. 175 Those choices by management, of course,
violate candor requirements and, thereby, undercut the very purposes of
disclosure.
The recent litigation over the Wells Fargo cross-sell strategy and resulting
scandal provides just such an example of failed discourse, candor, and disclosure.
At issue with Wells was its failure to tell shareholders about growing legal and
other issues. Like Leidos and Exxon, the plaintiffs in the Wells litigation argued
that the company did not disclose sales practice issues in its SEC filings. Yet, the
“fake-accounts scandal turned out to be a seminal moment for [the company],
tarnishing [its] reputation and upending its management team.176
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The role of the directors in this scandal has been the subject of
Congressional hearings, SEC questions, private-plaintiffs’ litigation, and even
consent decrees from the Federal Reserve. At the heart of the scandal was the
company’s key strategy and growth mechanism – its cross-sell program, which, it
turned out, was premised on fraud. The fraud and cultural issues at the company
were so widespread, that the regulators have taken the board to task for its
failures to challenge managements’ assertions. Indeed, according to the Federal
Reserve, management reports to the board “generally lacked detail and were not
accompanied by concrete action plans and metrics to track plan performance.”177
The board should have caught this. And, as a result, the Federal Reserve
instructed the board to “strengthen … oversight of the firm and senior
management.”178
Of course this scandal harmed the bank’s shareholders. Yet, like in the
Leidos and Exxon situations, the harms extend beyond investors to
customers/clients and employees. Further, like the 2008-2009 financial crisis,
bank scandals have the potential to cause harm to the public as well. For Wells,
the result has been billions in settlements and serious limitations on its business.
The process of publicness has thus resulted in some powerful forms of substantive
publicness, including, for example, limits on the bank’s ability to grow its assets
and a timetable for it to appoint new directors. It also faces ongoing scrutiny in
the form of requirements for it to submit certain plans for regulator approval.179
The Federal Reserve also required the directors to sign the consent order, making
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clear its view of their role.180 Their failures include a lack of candid discourse
within the boardroom and with the officers – a key role of directors that, when
successfully executed helps to ensure that the purpose of disclosure is fulfilled,
with sufficient attention to publicness.
Conclusion.
The purpose of securities disclosures is to increase the accountability of
the issuer and, thereby, to protect issuers, investors, and the public. Indeed, for
many of the reasons delineated in Part I, the incentives of issuers to disclose are
insufficient due to confidentiality and other concerns. As a result, we mandate a
disclosure regimen and insert directors into it to play a key gatekeeper role in
ensuring the accuracy of disclosures, including pressure testing for omissions.
Here is where discourse and candor come into play. They are part of the
information-forcing-substance regime, which is a product of both federal
securities laws and state fiduciary duties.

When it works, it increases the

accountability of management and the directors –to investors, to the markets, and
to the public more generally.181 Indeed, as designated securities monitors, the
regulatory goal is for directors to take ownership of disclosures by engaging with
management and ensuring accuracy.182

If they do so, they help to fulfill

disclosure’s purpose. Yet, to do so effectively, directors must both engage in
discourse and understand publicness and its potential impact on the company.
They must understand how their role connects to the entity’s boundaries and
private status, as well as to its public obligations, publicness, and social license
more broadly.183 Indeed, developing this understanding and engaging in the
180
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discourse will help to increase securities monitoring. In this sense then, discourse
and candor increase regulatory compliance. In short, pressure testing and candor
will produce better, more complete, and balanced disclosure outcomes for
investors, issuers, and the public – and thus, fulfill disclosure’s purpose.
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